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Abstract 
Companding methods have been profoundly applied in signal processing for quantization. And various companding 
schemes have been proposed to improve the PAPR (Peak to Average Power Ratio) of OFDM systems. In this paper, 
based on the exploration of the features of μ-law functions, we propose Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) with μ-
law companding methods. μ-law expanding function is used to preprocess the power traces collected during AES 
encryption on ASIC and FPGA respectively. Experiments show that it reduces the number of power traces to recover 
all the key bytes as much as 25.8% than the conventional CPA. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction
Power analysis (PA) attacks are based on analyzing the power consumption of the unit while it
performs the encryption operation. By either simple or differential analysis of the power the unit 
consumes, attacker can learn about the processes that are occurring inside the unit and gain some 
information, when combined with other cryptanalysis techniques, recover the secret key. Simple Power 
Analysis (SPA) attacks rely on detailed knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm being implemented and 
visual inspection of the power consumption curve, to extract the cryptographic key. Differential Power 
Analysis (DPA) attacks are more powerful based on SPA. It adds the power of statistical techniques to 
separate signal from noise, and requires less detailed knowledge of the implementation of the 
cryptographic algorithm. In 2004, Brier et al. [1] proposed the correlation power analysis (CPA) attack 
which uses the correlation factor between Hamming Distance and measured power to guess keys. The 
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work was based on the Hamming Distance leakage model, which was more advanced than Hamming 
Weight model. Then Le et al. [2] improved the performance of CPA by restricting the normalization 
factor in the proposed Partitioning Power Analysis method. 
Unlike the conventional CPA attacks, we propose that the CPA with power trace preprocessing, which 
takes advantage of the μ-law expanding functions to strengthen the critical points of the power trace while 
weaken the unrelated parts. The experiments show its effectiveness. The remainder of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 describes related research work. Section 3 presents the proposed 
companding methods in detail. Section 4 shows the CPA experiments and results. Section 5 draws 
conclusions and suggests future research. 
2. Related Work 
So far, there are a few previous works that address the preprocessing techniques for the power traces.In 
the work[3], the authors propose a preprocessing method based on the fourth-order cumulant to remove 
the effects due to Gaussian noise coupled into side channel signals. The experiment of analyzing 
electromagnetic signals during DES operation shows a decrease of power traces to detect the encryption 
key. But this high order statistic method leads to considerable computational cost. In another work [4], the 
authors select the expander of the A-law companding function, which is a non-linear transformation 
function to preprocess the power traces. The performance of the method is evaluated by analyzing the 
power consumption signals of micro-controller chip during DES operations. However the applications 
based on this equipment is limited.  
To further explore the preprocessing techniques with companding methods, we evaluated μ-law 
function with the power traces collected from AES encryption on ASIC and FPGA. We found that the 
number of power traces to recover the encryption keys can be further decreased after μ-law preprocessing. 
3. Proposed Preprocessing Method 
3.1. μ-law companding 
Originally, μ-law is companding scheme used in telephone network to get more dynamics to the 8 bit 
samples. OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) system uses the companding transform 
for PAPR reduction.The expression of μ-law companding functions, which including compressing 
function and expanding function are shown as (1) and (2) respectively,  
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where X is the vector of input signal, V is the maximum value of X, U is an adjustable parameter, log 
is natural logarithm operation, and sgn is the mathematical sign function. Y is the output signal. 
The feature of μ-law compressing and expanding functions are shown in Fig.1 and Fig.2 respectively. 
Both of them are central symmetry with center (0,0). Compared with compressing function, the output 
signal is magnified using expanding function when the input signal is between 0 and 2. This is the case 
for power trace. The range of power consumption is between 1.21 volt and 1.35 volt.  
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Fig.1  μ-law compressing feature          Fig.2  μ-law expanding feature 
3.2. CPA with μ-law companding 
The process of CPA with μ-law companding method is similar to conventional CPA, but with an 
additional preprocess of power trace. 
    
     Fig.3   (a) Sampling power traces from AES ASIC implementation. (b) Sampling power traces from 
AES FPGA implementation. The vertical axis denotes sampling voltage in volt. 
Secret key analysis is based on the side channel signals. The signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the 
collected signals influences the effect of secret key detection decisively. It is impossible, though, to 
arbitrarily change the SNR of the collected signals. We observe that the crypto-operation energy is 
concentrated on a region of particular amplitude, which is on the lower amplitudes.  
Take the power traces collected from AES on Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board 
(SASEBO-R)[5] as an example. The original power traces of AES encryption is on the bottom of Fig.3, 
while the μ-law preprocessed power traces are on the top of the figure. The waveforms which have lower 
altitude are expanded, while the waveforms which are near to the peaks are remained to be similar to the 
original curve. This exponential weight depending on the side channel signal amplitudes produces a more 
efficient signal, which enhances the performance of CPA. To further verify the effectiveness of μ-law 
expanding, we adopt it to preprocess the power traces collected during the AES encryption on SASEBO-
G, shown in Fig. 3(b). The communication interface is the same, but the implementation is on FPGA. The 
bottom curves are the original power traces and the top curves are the ones with μ-law expanding. The 
architecture of AES implementation is shown in Appendix(Fig.6). The relevant waveforms are stretched 
out over larger range. 
4. Experiments And Results 
4.1. Measurement setup 
Firstly, one specific point for the attack is selected. We choose the output of the final round of 
encryption function “add round key” as a target. Secondly, the encryption process is measured. 
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Experimental environment is shown in Appendix (Fig.7.). The connection between devices is shown in 
Fig.4. Computer randomly generates 128-bit plaintext in 10 thousand groups, which are transmitted to the 
FPGA through RS-232 serial ports, and then upon receipt of the plaintext, the FPGA control the ASIC to 
implement AES encryption program. At the same time, the execution signal on ASIC triggers the digital 
oscilloscope to start sampling, and thus the oscilloscope obtains power signals through its probe. The 
sampled data is transmitted to computer through LAN. When encryption is finished, the cipher text is 
transmitted to computer. So we obtain 10 thousand groups of plaintext, corresponding cipher text as well 
as 10 thousand power traces.  
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Fig.4 The connection between devices.           Fig. 5  Comparison of success rates  
Then Hamming Distance[1] Hi,R between the ciphertext Ci and the reference state R which is prior to 
“add round key” is calculated according to (3), where HW denotes the Hamming weight, i is the number 
of samplings. 
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Finally, the correlation coefficient is calculated. For a correct key, the operation is data dependent. 
Thereby, the leakage P(Ci) from EM signal has a linear relationship with Hamming Distance Hi,R , and the 
correct key is the one that maximizes the correlation coefficient ρ, given by(4). 
4.2. Experimental Results 
The results of the CPA with μ-law expanding function is shown in Table 1. The numbers of power 
traces for each key byte are listed. The 10th key byte needs the most signals. For conventional CPA, 16 
bytes of keys are recovered within 2604 power traces, while for expanding method, the power traces have 
been decreased to 1785. 25.8% reduction has been achieved. The success rate of CPA via the number of 
power traces are also compared in Fig.5. It shows that the correct keys appear faster with μ-law 
expanding, which means the accuracy of key detection is improved.  
Table 1. The number of needed signals for revealing each key byte. 
No. K1 K 2 K 3 K 4 K 5 K 6 K 7 K 8 
conventional 2,058 795 1,414 607 1,621 1,812 1,293 853 
expanding 1,103 763 1,121 562 1,018 1,707 1,299 846 
No. K 9 K 10 K 11 K 12 K 13 K 14 K 15 K16 
conventional 431 2,406 1,809 2,125 1,536 934 1,418 1,548 
expanding 407 1,785 1,514 1,619 841 492 1,207 1,233 
communication 
power samples
trigger signal 
serial port 
GND
Computer
AES 
FPGA 
oscilloscope
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In order to confirm the effectiveness of μ-law expanding, the experiment is repeated on SASEBO-G, 
the number of signals is reduced by 21.9%. But it takes 3514 power traces to recover all the key bytes. 
This may result from the lower SNR in the collected waveforms, which is less smooth than the signal 
from ASIC implementation. 
We also compared the results of the other settings of the parameter U (in equation (2)). When U is 
larger than 1, the number of power traces is reduced as much as 30%, when it is smaller than 1, the 
number of power traces remain the same as conventional CPA. 
5. Conclusions 
CPA with μ-law expanding methods is proposed in this paper. The experiments against AES 
implementations on ASIC and FPGA confirm its effectiveness. Compared with conventional CPA, it 
reduces the number of power traces as much as 25.8%. The performance of CPA is enhanced. There is 
several works to do in future. Other companding functions or signal processing techniques will be 
explored and compared to find the optimal to further reduce the power traces.  
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Fig.6 AES implementation on SASEBO.           Fig.7  Experimental environment (SASEBO-R, 
oscilloscope, etc.)    
